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BRIDGING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COPYRIGHT’S
LEGAL TRADITIONS – THE EMERGING EC FAIR
USE DOCTRINE**
by MARTIN SENFTLEBEN*
In the current online environment, more flexibility in the field of copyright
limitations is a legislative necessity rather than a mere regulatory option.
From a social and cultural perspective, the Web 2.0, with its advanced search
engine services, interactive platforms and various forms of user-generated
content, is central to the promotion and enhancement of freedom of expres-
sion and information.  From an economic perspective, it creates a parallel
universe of traditional content providers relying on copyright protection,
and emerging Internet industries whose further development depends on ro-
bust copyright limitations.   In particular, the newcomers in the online mar-
ket — social networking sites, video forums and virtual worlds — promise a
remarkable potential for economic growth that have already attracted the
attention of the OECD.1
Current EC copyright law, however, is likely to frustrate these opportunities
for cultural, social and economic development.   In contrast to U.S. copy-
right law, flexible elements, such as an open-ended fair use provision, are
sought in vain.  Instead, the EC Copyright Directive 2001/292 encourages
**The present article is part of a broader research project concerning the
development of a horizontal fair use defence that could be applied across the
different domains of intellectual property law.  For an introduction to this
horizontal fair use approach, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Overprotection and
Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law – the Need for Horizontal Fair Use
Defences, in HORIZONTAL ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
UNCOVERING THE MATRIX, ATRIP CONFERENCE 2009 (Annette Kur ed., 2010,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597123.
*Ph.D.; Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam; Senior
Consultant, Bird & Bird, The Hague.
1 See OECD, Participative Web: User-Created Content, doc. DSTI/ICCP/
IE(2006)7/Final, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/
browseit/9307031E.PDF. Cf. Thomas Dreier, Prima¨r- und Folgema¨rkte, in
Gerhard Schricker, THOMAS DREIER & ANNETTE KUR, GEISTIGES EIGEN-
TUM IM DIENST DER INNOVATION 51 (2001); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, Die
Schranken des Urheberrechts als Instrumente der Innovationsfo¨rderung –
Freie Gedanken zur Ausschlieblichkeit im Urheberrecht, GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONAL [GRUR INT’L] 459
(2008).
2 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
May 22, 2001 [hereinafter EC Copyright Directive], on the harmonization
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.
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the further restriction of precisely-defined statutory exceptions in the light of
the EC three-step test that has been modelled on similar international provi-
sions.3   Against this background, the time is ripe to debate the introduction
of an EC fair use doctrine that would open up the current restrictive system,
offer sufficient breathing space for social, cultural and economic needs, and
enable the EC copyright infrastructure to keep pace with the rapid develop-
ment of the Internet.
For this purpose, the differences between the continental-European and the
Anglo-American approach to copyright limitations (section I), and the ra-
tionale of fair use legislation (section II) will be discussed before embarking
on an analysis of current problems that have arisen in the EC (section III).
On this basis the conceptual contours of an EC fair use doctrine will be
discussed (section IV).  Drawing conclusions, the international dimension
of the proposed fair use initiative will be considered (section V).
I. DIFFERENCES
International law making and harmonization activities have led to a
remarkable convergence of Anglo-American copyright and continental-
European droit d’auteur.  To this day, however, the approach to copyright
limitations differs significantly: Whereas continental-European countries
provide for a closed catalogue of carefully-defined limitations, the Anglo-
American copyright tradition allows for an open-ended fair use system
that leaves the task of identifying individual cases of exempted unautho-
rized use to the courts.
A catalogue of various types of continental-European statutory copy-
right exceptions can be found in Article 5 of the EC Copyright Directive.
Besides the mandatory exemption of temporary acts of reproduction to be
implemented by all Member States, Article 5 contains optional exceptions
that relate to private copying, use of copyrighted material by libraries, mu-
seums and archives, ephemeral recordings, reproductions of broadcasts
made by hospitals and prisons, illustrations for teaching or scientific re-
search, use for the benefit of people with a disability, press privileges, use
for the purpose of quotations, caricature, parody and pastiche, use for the
purposes of public security and for the proper performance or reporting of
administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings, use of political
speeches and public lectures, use during religious or official celebrations,
3 See EC Copyright Directive art. 5(5) on the one hand, and Berne Convention
art. 9(2), TRIPS art. 13, and WCT art. 10 on the other hand. Cf. MARTIN
R.F. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST –
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPY-
RIGHT LAW 125-33 (2004); Christophe Geiger, From Berne to National Law,
via the Copyright Directive, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [EIPR] 486 (2007).
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use of architectural works located permanently in public places, incidental
inclusions of a work in other material, use for the purpose of advertising
the public exhibition or sale of artistic works, use in connection with the
demonstration or repair of equipment, use for the reconstruction of build-
ings, and additional cases of use having minor importance.
A prominent example of the Anglo-American approach to copyright
limitations is the fair use doctrine that has evolved in the United States.
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act permits the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material for purposes “such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”4  To guide the decision on
individual forms of use, four factors are set forth in the provision which
shall be taken into account among other considerations that may be rele-
vant in a given case:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.5
On the basis of this legislative framework and established case law, U.S.
courts conduct a case-by-case analysis in order to determine whether a
given use can be exempted from the control of the copyright holder.6
4 The list is understood as an open, non-exclusive enumeration. See H. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 65-66 and S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975), quoted in L.E. SELT-
ZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT – THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT, CAMBRIDGE 19-20 (1978) (“[S]ince
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable defini-
tion is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts. . . .  The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judi-
cial doctrine of fair use . . . but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine
in the statute. . . .  Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
5 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
6 The factors provide guidance for the application of the “equitable rule of rea-
son” which fair use represents. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448, 450 n.31, 454, 455 n.40 (1984).  Additional
factors may be taken into account.  As for the application of the fair use
doctrine in practice, see Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125-30; Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law
in Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 588, 612 (1997); David Nim-
mer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS, 263 (2003); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 543 (2008).
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The remarkable difference in the regulation of copyright limitations
becomes understandable in the light of the theoretical groundwork under-
lying common law and civil law copyright systems.  The fair use approach
can be traced back to the utilitarian foundation of the Anglo-American
copyright tradition perceiving copyright as a prerogative granted to en-
hance the overall welfare of society by ensuring a sufficient supply of
knowledge and information.7  This theoretical basis only justifies rights
strong enough to induce the desired production of intellectual works.
Therefore, the exclusive rights of authors deserve individual positive legal
enactment.8  Those forms of use that need not be reserved for the rights
owner to provide the necessary incentive remain free.  Otherwise, rights
would be awarded that are unnecessary to achieve the goals of the system.
In sum, exclusive rights are thus delineated precisely, while their limitation
can be regulated flexibly in open-ended provisions, such as fair use.9
Oversimplifying the theoretical model underlying common law copyright,
it might be said that freedom of use is the rule, rights are the exception.
The opposite constellation — rights the rule, freedom the exception
— follows from the natural law underpinning of continental-European
droit d’auteur.  In the natural law theory, the author occupies centre
stage.10  A literary or artistic work is perceived as a materialization of the
author’s personality.  Accordingly, it is assumed that a bond unites the
author with the object of her creation.11  Moreover, the author acquires a
property right in her work by virtue of the mere act of creation.  This has
the corollary that nothing is left to the law apart from formally recognizing
what is already inherent in the “very nature of things.”12   The author-
centrism of the civil law system calls on the legislator to safeguard rights
broad enough to concede to authors the opportunity to profit from the use
7 In this vein, the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, referred to copyright as an
“engine of free expression” in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
8 Cf. Alain Strowel, Droit d’auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature,
in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 235, 241-49 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel
eds.,1994); Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights
in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to
Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward
System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 310 (1998).
9 See Paul E. Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace
and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 8, at
159; Strowel, supra note 8, at 250-51.
10 Cf. Bernard Edelman, The Law’s Eye: Nature and Copyright, in OF AUTHORS
AND ORIGINS, supra note 8, at 79, 82-87; Geller, supra note 9, at 169-70;
Strowel, supra note 8, at 236-37.
11 Cf. EUGEN ULMER, URHEBER- UND VERLAGSRECHT 110-11 (1980). See
HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (2d ed. 1978).
12 See DESBOIS, supra note 11, 538; ULMER, supra note 11, at 105-06.
\\server05\productn\C\CPY\57-3\CPY312.txt unknown Seq: 5 18-OCT-10 11:38
Bridging the Differences 525
of their self-expression, and to bar factors that might stymie their exploita-
tion.   In consequence, civil law copyright systems recognize flexible, broad
exclusive rights.  Exceptions, by contrast, are defined narrowly and often
interpreted restrictively.13
II. RATIONALE
The analysis on the basis of copyright theory explains the evolution of
fair use in common law jurisdictions.  For present purposes, however, it is
essential to identify the particular advantage of fair use legislation.  With-
out a strong argument weighing in favour of fair use, the antagonism be-
tween author centrism and flexible rights in civil law jurisdictions, and
utilitarianism and flexible limitations in common law jurisdictions, can
hardly ever be overcome.14  To bring to light the merits of fair use, the
costs of copyright protection must be considered.  The grant of exclusive
rights in literary and artistic works restricts fundamental freedoms, partic-
ularly freedom of expression and freedom of competition.15  From an eco-
nomic perspective, it can be added that copyright monopolies, while
spurring investment in new information products, also impede follow-on
innovation requiring the use of pre-existing, protected material.16  Hence,
13 Cf. F.WILLEM GROSHEIDE, AUTEURSRECHT OP MAAT 2 (1986); Geller, supra
note 9, at 170; Strowel, supra note 8, at 249-50.  For a recent confirmation of
this questionable dogma, see ACHIM FO¨RSTER, FAIR USE 182-84 (2008). Cf.
ECJ, July 16, 2009, case C-5/08, INFOPAQ INT’L/DANSKE DAGBLADES
FORENING, available at http://www.curia.eu.
14 Admittedly, this antagonism may not be overestimated anyway from a histori-
cal perspective. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORI-
GINS, supra note 8, at  131, 133.
15 See EGBERT J. DOMMERING, DE ACHTERVOLGING VAN PROMETHEUS – OVER
VRIJHEID EN BEZIT VAN INFORMATIE, AMSTERDAM: (2008); Christophe Gei-
ger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fun-
damental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 IIC 371
(2006); DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTE´ D’EXPRESSION (Alain Strowel, Fran-
c¸ois Tulkens & Dirk Voorhoof eds., 2006); P.Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright
and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF IN-
FORMATION 239 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W. Netanel eds., 2002); Thomas
Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or
Outside of Proprietary Rights?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECON-
OMY 295-316 (2001); SANDRO MACCIACCHINI, URHEBERRECHT UND
MEINUNGSFREIHEIT (2000); Yochai Benkler, FREE AS THE AIR TO COMMON
USE: FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON ENCLOSURE OF THE PUBLIC DO-
MAIN, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 355 (1999); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J 283 (1996).
16 Cf. WILLIAM N. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  With regard to copyright law,
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there is a delicate balance between freedom and protection inherent in
copyright law.  The cultural innovation cycle supported by copyright law
requires both rights broad enough to spur investment and creativity, and
limitations broad enough to provide sufficient breathing space for freedom
of expression and freedom of competition.17
With regard to the maintenance of this balance, fair use has a crucial
role to play.  In advanced copyright protection systems offering flexible,
broad exclusive rights, it is wise to employ fair use as a counterbalance.  In
this way, the risk of counterproductive overprotection can be minimized.
On the basis of an elastic fair use test, the courts can keep the broad grant
of protection within reasonable limits and inhibit exclusive rights from un-
duly curtailing competing freedoms.  Accordingly, the fair use discussion
must not be confined to the rather theoretical question of whether free-
dom of use should be the rule, and protection the exception.  Instead, it
raises the fundamental question of appropriate balancing tools within the
copyright system. Flexible rights necessitate flexible limitations.  This be-
comes obvious in times of new technological developments that impact the
copyright system.  In these times of change, broad exclusive rights are
likely to absorb and restrict new possibilities of use even though this may
be undesirable from the perspective of social, cultural or economic
needs.18  In this situation, flexible fair use factors ensure a fast reaction.
They allow the courts to reestablish a proper balance between freedom
and protection.19 A closed system of narrowly-defined limitations, by con-
see William N. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J.  LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
17 Cf. Martin R.F. Senftleben, Der kulturelle Imperativ des Urheberrechts, in
KUNST IM MARKT – KUNST IM RECHT (Matthias Weller,  Nicolai B. Kemle
& Thomas Dreier eds., 2010); NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX,
(2008).
18 With regard to the critical assessment of broad IP protection, see GIUSEPPE
MAZZIOTTI, EU DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE END-USER (2008);
GEISTIGES EIGENTUM: SCHUTZRECHT ODER AUSBEUTUNGSTITEL? (Otto
Depenheuer & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer eds., 2008); Reto M. Hilty, Su¨n-
denbock Urheberrecht?, in GEISTIGES EIGENTUM UND GEMEINFREIHEIT 111
(Ansgar Ohly & Diethelm Klippel eds., 2007); RETO M. HILTY& ALEXAN-
DER PEUKERT, INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM URHEBERRECHT (2004); CHRIS-
TOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A` L’INFORMATION,
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE´ (2004); DETLEF KRO¨GER, INFORMATION-
SFREIHEIT UND URHEBERRECHT (2002); Thomas Hoeren, Urheberrecht in
der Informationsgesellschaft, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 866 (1997).
19 The U.S. fair use doctrine, for instance, has always been understood as an open
regulation of copyright limitations.  The list of purposes referred to in Sec-
tion 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act is understood as an open, non-exclusive
enumeration. See H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 and S. REP. NO. 94-473, at
62 (1975), quoted in SELTZER, supra note 4, at 19-20.
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trast, is likely to react too slowly to unforeseen challenges.  It requires the
intervention of the legislator and the development of new, specific excep-
tions.  This process of law making can hardly keep pace with rapid techno-
logical advances.  As a result, the balance between freedom and protection
will be lost.
Hence, the central advantage of a fair use approach is sufficient flexi-
bility for safeguarding copyright’s delicate balance between exclusive
rights and limitations satisfying social, cultural and economic needs.
Within a flexible fair use framework, the courts can broaden and restrict
the scope of limitations.  In this way, they are capable of adapting the
copyright limitation infrastructure to new circumstances and challenges,
such as the digital environment.  Leaving this discretion to the courts
reduces the need for constant amendments to legislation that may have
difficulty in keeping pace with the speed of technological development.20
Admittedly, the advantage of flexibility implies the risk of legal un-
certainty.21  The validity of this counter-argument, however, appears
doubtful in the light of the wealth of established case law that has been
accumulated in countries with a long-standing fair use tradition, such as
the U.S.  Arguably, past experiences in identifying and delineating copy-
right limitations case-by-case enhance the foreseeability of future deci-
sions and ensure a sufficient degree of legal certainty.22  In national
systems switching from a closed list of statutory exceptions to an open-
ended fair use approach, shortcomings in the area of legal certainty seem
unlikely anyway.  A sufficient degree of legal certainty can easily be se-
cured by applying case law established under the old system as a basis of
the new fair use system.
20 See Martin R.F. Senftleben, Beperkingen a` la carte: Waarom de Auteursrech-
trichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN
INFORMATIERECHT 10 (2003); Christiaan A. Alberdingk Thijm, Fair use: het
auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA
EN INFORMATIERECHT 145 (1998); Fair use – In weiter Ferne, so nah, TIJD-
SCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 176 (1998).
21 See Herman Cohen Jehoram, Fair use – die ferne Geliebte, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 174 (1998), Herman Cohen
Jehoram, Implementatie van de Auteursrechtrichtlijn – De stille strijd tegen
een spookrijder, NJB 1690 (2002), Herman Cohen Jehoram, Nu de gevolgen
van trouw en ontrouw aan de Auteursrechtrichtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke
reproductie en driestappentoets, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN IN-
FORMATIERECHT 153 (2005), Herman Cohen Jehoram, Wie is bang voor de
driestappentoets in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn?, in: DOMMERING-BUNDEL 57,
(N.A.N.M. van Eijk & P.Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2008).
22 In this sense SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, 162-68. Cf. Beebe, supra note 6.
However, see the critical comments by FO¨RSTER, supra note 13, 197-201, on
the unrestricted openness of the U.S. system.  With regard to the predict-
ability of fair use decisions, see also Nimmer, supra note 6.
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The assertion of insufficient legal certainty, therefore, can be un-
masked as a strategic argument that offers advocates of restrictively-delin-
eated limitations the opportunity to present traditional continental-
European systems as shining examples of legal certainty.  In this line of
reasoning, the detailed definition of limitations in continental-European
copyright legislation clearly indicates the scope of permitted unauthorized
use, and makes court decisions foreseeable — even in the digital environ-
ment.23  Experiences with the current EC limitation infrastructure, how-
ever, show that the present EC system is incapable of generating these
beneficial effects.  The system provides neither legal certainty nor suffi-
cient flexibility in the area of copyright limitations.
III. EC WORST CASE SCENARIO
The adaptation of EC copyright law to the digital environment has led
to a legislative framework that imposes a heavy burden on users of copy-
righted material.  Elements of both traditions of copyright law have been
combined in the most unfortunate way. In the EC Copyright Directive,
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 5 set forth a closed catalogue of excep-
tions.  As indicated above, this enumeration is in line with the continental-
European copyright tradition of precisely-defined copyright limitations.
The listed exceptions, however, are subject to a three-step test that was
modelled on Articles 9(2) Berne Convention, 13 TRIPs and 10 WCT.  This
EC three-step test is laid down in paragraph 5.24  As the test consists of
several open-ended criteria, it recalls the Anglo-American copyright tradi-
tion.25  However, the interplay between the two elements — the closed
catalogue and the open three-step test — is regulated as follows:
The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4
shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a
23 For a recent invocation of this line of argument, see, e.g., Andre´ Lucas, For a
Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 277 EIPR 282 (2010).
24 As to the drafting history of this hybrid framework for copyright exceptions,
see Michael Hart, The Proposed Directive for Copyright in the Information
Society: Nice Rights, Shame about the Exceptions, EIPR 169 (1998); P.Bernt
Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Inva-
lid, EIPR 499 (2000); D.J.G. Visser, De beperkingen in de Auteursrechtrich-
tlijn, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 9 (2001);
Frank Bayreuther, Beschra¨nkungen des Urheberrechts nach der neuen EU-
Urheberrechtsrichtlinie, ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT
[ZUM] 828 (2001); Jo¨rg Reinbothe, Die EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in
der Informationsgesellschaft, GRUR INT’L 733 (2001).
25 The criterion of “no conflict with a normal exploitation,” for instance, resem-
bles the fourth fair use factor “effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.”  With regard to the application of fair
use analyses concerning the fourth factor in the context of the three-step
test, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 184-87.
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normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.26
This approach, inevitably, leads to a dilemma.  As discussed, a closed
list of precisely-defined exceptions, if anything, has the advantage of en-
hanced legal certainty.27  This potential advantage, however, is beyond
reach under the current EC system.  If national legislation adopts and fur-
ther specifies exceptions from the EC catalogue, these specific national
exceptions may still be challenged on the grounds that they are incompati-
ble with the EC three-step test.  In other words, national exceptions that
are already embedded in an inflexible national framework may further be
restricted by invoking the three-step test.  On the one hand, national copy-
right exceptions are thus straitjacketed.  Their validity is hanging by the
thread of compliance with the abstract criteria of the EC three-step test.
On the other hand, the test itself may only be invoked to further restrict
national exceptions.  Unlike fair use provisions with comparable abstract
criteria, it cannot be employed by the courts to create new, additional
forms of permitted unauthorized use.  Hence, it is impossible to realize the
central advantage of flexibility that is inherent in open norms, such as the
U.S. fair use doctrine.28
In consequence, the current EC system provides neither sufficient
flexibility for copyright limitations nor sufficient legal certainty for users of
copyrighted material.  It combines the two disadvantages of the Anglo-
American and the continental-European approach.  The corrosive effect
of this dysfunctional concept can currently be observed in EC Member
States.  The following overview of Dutch (section III.A), French (section
III.B) and German (section III.C) case law gives evidence of the need for
an EC fair use doctrine (section III.D).
26 See EC Copyright Directive art. 5(5).
27 Cf. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 21.
28 Cf. Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in the Netherlands – a Renaissance?, TIJD-
SCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT 1 (2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986; Jonathan Griffiths, The “Three-Step
Test” in European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, INTELL. PROP.
Q. 489, 495 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968; Chris-
tophe Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?,
37 IIC. 683 (2006), K.J. Koelman, De nationale driestappentoets, TIJD-
SCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 6 (2003).  The re-
strictive nature and chilling effect of the EC copyright three-step test has
been confirmed by the ECJ, July 16, 2009, case C-5/08, Infopaq/Danske
Dagblades Forening.  The Court pointed out that the precisely-defined ex-
ception of Article 5(1) of the EC Copyright Directive, in addition, had to
satisfy the criteria of the three-step test laid down in Article 5(5).
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A. Legal Uncertainty: The Netherlands
Dutch courts applied the three-step test already prior to the Copy-
right Directive.29  On the one hand, the adoption and implementation of
the Directive led to more frequent references to the three-step test that
are made to confirm and strengthen findings equally following from do-
mestic rules.30  This way of applying the three-step test has little impact on
the Dutch catalogue of statutory exceptions.  On the other hand, however,
the Directive inspired a line of decisions that use the three-step test to
override the closed Dutch system of precisely-defined user privileges.
In a ruling of March 2, 2005, the District Court of The Hague forced
the long-standing exception for press reviews onto the sidelines, and in-
voked the three-step test of the Copyright Directive instead.31  The case
concerned the unauthorized scanning and reproduction of press articles
for internal electronic communication (via e-mail, intranet etc.) in minis-
tries — a practice that also offered certain search and archive functions.
Seeking to determine whether this practice was permissible, the court re-
fused to consider several questions raised by the parties with regard to the
specific rules laid down in Article 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act and Arti-
cle 5(3)(c) of the EC Copyright Directive.  In the court’s view, considera-
29 In the case Zienderogen Kunst, dating back to the year 1990, the Dutch Su-
preme Court invoked the three-step test of Article 9(2) of the Berne Con-
vention to support its holding that the quotation of a work may not
substantially prejudice the right holder’s interest in the exploitation of the
work concerned. See Hoge Raad, June 22, 1990, no. 13933, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 1991, at. 268, with case comment by Jaap H. Spoor; IN-
FORMATIERECHT/AMI 202 (1990), with case comment by Egbert J. Dom-
mering; 40 AA 672 (1991), with case comment by Herman Cohen Jehoram.
30 In 2003, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals found that a parody did not harm
the normal exploitation of the parodied work because it concerned a differ-
ent market. See Gerechtshof Amsterdam, Jan. 30, 2003, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 94 (2003), with case comment by
Kamiel J. Koelman.  In a 2006 decision concerning online advertisements
reproducing the so-called “TRIPP TRAPP chair,” the Court of Zwolle-
Lelystad referred to the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Directive in
the context of Article 23 of the Dutch Copyright Act — a limitation permit-
ting the use of certain artistic works for the purpose of advertising their
public exhibition or sale.  The court found that the use in question
prejudiced the exploitation interest of the right holder. This was one of the
reasons for denying compliance with Article 23. See Rechtbank Zwolle-
Lelystad, May 3, 2006, case no. 106031, LJN: AW 6288, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 179 (2006), with case comment by
Kamiel J. Koelman, MEDIAFORUM 2006/9 with case comment by Bart T.
Beuving.
31 See Rechtbank Den Haag, Mar. 2, 2005, case no. 192880, LJN: AS 8778, COM-
PUTERRECHT 143 (2005) with case comment by Kamiel J. Koelman
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tion of these specific rules was unnecessary because the contested use did
not meet the requirements of the EC three-step test anyway:
The reason for leaving these three questions unanswered is that the digi-
tal press review practice of the State, in the opinion of the court, does not
comply with the so-called three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Copyright
Directive.32
The subsequent discussion of non-compliance with the three-step test
resembles a U.S. fair use analysis rather than a close inspection of a conti-
nental-European statutory limitation.  In particular, the Court stresses the
growing importance of digital newspaper exploitation and the impact of
digital press reviews on this promising market.  The ministry press reviews
are held to “endanger” a normal exploitation of press articles and unrea-
sonably prejudice the publisher’s legitimate interest in digital commerciali-
zation.33  Under the fourth U.S. fair use factor “effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” similar considera-
tions could play a decisive role.34
The focus on the three-step test, constituting the basis of the court’s
reasoning in the press review case, inevitably marginalizes the detailed
rules established in Dutch law.  On its merits, the applicable statutory limi-
tation laid down in Article 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act merely opens
the door to the three-step test.  As a result, it is rendered incapable of
influencing the further test procedure.35
In a more recent decision of June 25, 2008, the District Court of The
Hague invoked the three-step test again in a case concerning the payment
of equitable remuneration for private copying activities.  In this context,
the court devoted attention to the question of use of an illegal source as a
basis for private copying.36  The detailed regulation of private copying in
Article 16c of the Dutch Copyright Act does not contain any indication to
the effect that private copying from an illegal source is to be deemed im-
permissible.  The drafting history of the provision, by contrast, reflects the
clear intention of the Dutch legislator to exempt private copying irrespec-
32 See Rechtbank Den Haag, case no. 192880 para. 14.
33 See id. paras. 16–18.
34 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(“[A]ctual harm need not be shown. . . .  Nor is it necessary to show with
certainty that future harm will result.  What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future
harm exists.”).
35 See Martin R.F. Senftleben, L’application du triple test: vers un syste`me de fair
use europe´en?, PROPRIE´TE´S INTELLECTUELLES 453 (2007).
36 See Rechtbank Den Haag, case 246698, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA
EN INFORMATIERECHT 146 (2008), with case comment by Cyril B. van der
Net.
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tive of whether a legal or illegal source is used.37 Having recourse to the
three-step test of Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive, the District
Court of The Hague, nonetheless, dismantled this seemingly robust edifice
of legal certainty in one single sentence.  Without offering a detailed
analysis, the court stated that private copying from an illegal source was
“in conflict with the three-step test.”  Accordingly, it was held to fall
outside the private copying exemption of Article 16c:
In the parliamentary history, there are indications of a different interpre-
tation. However, the interpretation advocated by the minister and sup-
ported by the government — assuming that private copying from an
illegal source was legal — is in conflict with the three-step test of Article
5(5) of the Directive.38
The central point here is not the prohibition of private copying using
illegal sources. It is the erosion of the central argument weighing in favor
of precisely-defined exceptions and against a fair use system.  Regardless
of precise definitions given in the Dutch Copyright Act, the ruling of the
Court minimizes the degree of legal certainty in the field of copyright limi-
tations.  Users of copyrighted material in the Netherlands can no longer
rely on the wording of the applicable statutory exception.  On the basis of
the EC three-step test, a certain use may be held to amount to copyright
infringement even though it is exempted from the authorization of the
right holder in the Dutch Copyright Act.39  Hence, the degree of legal
certainty can hardly be deemed higher than the degree attained in a fair
use system.  Arguably, the standard of certainty is even lower because the
additional scrutiny of precisely-defined exceptions in the light of the three-
step test is not reflected in the Dutch Copyright Act. In copyright systems
with a statutory fair use provision, by contrast, the factors applied by the
courts are clearly stated in the law. Consulting Section 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act, users of copyrighted material in the U.S., for instance, can
inform themselves about the criteria that the courts will consider when
determining the permissibility of a given unauthorized use.
B. Inflexibility: France
Admittedly, this problem of insufficient transparency can easily be
solved by incorporating the three-step test of the EC Copyright Directive
37 See the material quoted by the Rechtbank Den Haag,  para. 4.4.1.
38 See Rechtbank Den Haag, case 246698, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA
EN INFORMATIERECHT 146 (2008), with case comment by van der Net, supra
note 36, para. 4.4.3.
39 See Martin R.F. Senftleben, Prive´-kopie¨ren in het licht van de driestappentoets
– opmerkingen naar aanleiding van het vonnis van de Haagse rechtbank in-
zake de thuiskopie, INTELL. EIGENDOM EN RECLAMERECHT 265 (2008).
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into national law.  In EC Member States following this approach,40 the
tension between precisely-defined exceptions on the one hand, and addi-
tional control on the basis of the abstract criteria of the three-step test on
the other hand, is made obvious for users relying on copyright exceptions.
In France, for instance, it is apparent from national legislation that use
falling under a copyright exception will additionally be scrutinized in the
light of the three-step test. According to Article L. 122-5 of the French
Intellectual Property Code, the listed statutory exceptions may neither
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work nor prejudice the author’s
legitimate interests.41
The central problem raised by an additional examination of excep-
tions in the light of the three-step test, however, cannot be solved in this
way.  Although copyright exceptions are already defined precisely, their
application still depends on compliance with the open-ended three-step
test.  As a result, the attainable degree of legal certainty is reduced sub-
stantially when compared with the traditional continental-European ap-
proach of precisely-defined exceptions that are not additionally examined
on the basis of abstract criteria.42
The amalgam of specific statutory exceptions and the open-ended
three-step test, moreover, further diminishes the flexibility of systems with
precisely-defined use privileges. Like the reported Dutch cases, the French
case “Mulholland Drive” gives evidence of this freezing effect.  The case
was brought by a purchaser of a DVD of David Lynch’s film Mulholland
Drive who sought to transfer the film into VHS format in order to watch it
at his mother’s house.  Technical protection measures applied by the film
40 For an overview of the implementation strategies followed by EC Member
States, see INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER STATES’ LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC
ON THE HARMONIZATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND RE-
LATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2007), available at http://
www.ivir.nl.
41 Cf.  Andre´ Lucas & Pierre Sirinelli, Chronique: Droit d’auteur et droits voisins,
PROPRIE´TE´S INTELLECTUELLES, 297, 314-16 (2006); V.L. Benabou, Patatras!
A propos de la de´cision du Conseil constitutionnel du 27 juillet 2006,
PROPRIE´TE´S INTELLECTUELLES 240 (2006); Christophe Geiger, The French
Implementation of the Information Society Directive: A Disappointing Result
of a Promising Debate, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMA-
TIERECHT 1 (2008); Martin R.F. Senftleben, L’application du triple test: vers
un syste`me de fair use europe´en?, PROPRIE´TE´S INTELLECTUELLES 453 (2007).
42 Therefore, it is inconsistent to invoke legal certainty as an argument to justify
the current hybrid EC concept of specific exceptions that are additionally
controlled in the light of the three-step test.  Nonetheless, this argument is
still advanced by Lucas, supra note 23, at 282.
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producers prevented the making of the VHS copy.43  In this regard, the
French Supreme Court held that the relevant Articles L. 122-5 and L. 211-
3 of the French Intellectual Property Code had to be interpreted in the
light of the three-step test. The exception for private copying could not be
invoked against the application of technical protection measures when the
intended act of copying would conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work concerned.44
Examining the private copying exception in the light of this criterion
of the three-step test, the French Supreme Court rejected the previous
decision taken by the Paris Court of Appeals.  The latter Court had ruled
that the intended private copy did not encroach upon the film’s normal
DVD exploitation.45  The French Supreme Court reversed this holding for
two reasons.  On the one hand, it asserted that a conflict with a normal
exploitation had to be determined against the background of the enhanced
risk of piracy inherent in the digital environment.  On the other hand, the
Court underlined that the exploitation of cinematographic works on DVD
was important for recouping the investment in film productions.46
The verdict of the French Supreme Court resembles the decisions
taken in the Netherlands.  It is based on the three-step test rather than the
specific requirements laid down in the national statutory exception.  On its
merits, the national exception merely constitutes a starting point for the
Court to embark on a scrutiny of the contested use in the light of the
three-step test.  The result of this way of applying the test is the erosion of
the French private copying exception in the digital environment.47  The
Court employs the three-step test to place further constraints on the scope
of the national exception.  In consequence, the limited flexibility of the
French system of precisely-defined use privileges is further restricted.
43 See Cour de cassation franc¸aise, case 05-15824, Feb. 28, 2006, Mulholland
Drive: JCP e´d. G 2006, II, 10084, with case comment by  Andre´ Lucas.  For
further commentary, see Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Bal-
anced Copyright Law?, supra note 28; Laurier Y. Ngombe, Technical Mea-
sures of Protection Versus Copy for Private Use: Is the French Legal Saga
Over?, EIPR 61 (2007).
44 See Cour de cassation, JCP e´d. G 2006, II, 10084.
45 See Cour d’appel de Paris, fourth chamber B, decision of Apr. 22, 2005, Juris-
Data n° 2005-268600, Mulholland Drive, JCP e´d. G 2005, II, 10126, with
case comment by Christophe Geiger.
46 See Cour de cassation, JCP e´d. G 2006, II, 10084.
47 Cf. Christophe Geiger, The Answer to the Machine Should Not Be the Ma-
chine: Safeguarding the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment,
EIPR 121 (2008).
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C. Alternative Routes: Germany
German case law also testifies to the insufficient flexibility of the cur-
rent EC framework for copyright limitations.  While the foregoing Dutch
and French examples illustrate problems arising from the application of
the three-step test, however, developments in Germany show that the very
basis of the current EC system — a closed catalogue of precisely-defined
exceptions — already renders the courts incapable of keeping pace with
the constant evolution of new Internet technologies.  Complex questions
about the scope of precisely-defined exceptions arise particularly with re-
gard to the distribution of primary and secondary markets for information
products and services.48  In the relation between copyright or database
owners and search engines, for instance, the right of quotation has become
a crucial factor.
Implementing the EC Copyright Directive, legislators in EC Member
States, as indicated above, enjoyed the freedom to choose exceptions from
the catalogue of Article 5 of the Directive and tailor the scope of resulting
use privileges to individual national needs.  Apart from the mandatory ex-
emption of temporary acts of reproduction, the transposition of exceptions
into national law is optional under the Copyright Directive.  In conse-
quence, the domestic scope of an exception listed in Article 5 of the Direc-
tive, such as the right of quotation, may differ from country to country.
These differences can have a deep impact on the information that may be
displayed by search engines in EC Member States without the authoriza-
tion of the copyright owner.
The Dutch legislator, for instance, decided to broaden the scope of
the right of quotation during the implementation of the EC Copyright Di-
rective.  The long-standing “context requirement” of Article 15a of the
Dutch Copyright Act, according to which quotations had to serve the pur-
pose of criticism and review, has been attenuated.  In the amended ver-
sion, the provision is also applicable to announcements and expressions
serving comparable purposes.  Accordingly, the quotation right has been
held to cover information made available by search engines on the
grounds that these engines “announce” the contents of underlying source
databases.49   In a case concerning a search engine that collects informa-
tion from the websites of housing agencies, the Court of Alkmaar clarified
that for the quotation right to apply, the reproduction and communication
48 Cf. Dreier, supra note 1; Geiger, Die Schranken des Urheberrechts als Instru-
mente der Innovationsfo¨rderung – Freie Gedanken zur Ausschlieblichkeit im
Urheberrecht, supra note 1.
49 See Gerechtshof Arnhem, July 4, 2006, case no. 06/416, LJN AY0089,
MEDIAFORUM 21 (2007), with case comment by Bart T. Beuving; TIJD-
SCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 93 (2007), with
case comment by Kamiel J. Koelman.
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of collected data to the public had to keep within the limits of what was
necessary to give a good impression of the housing offer concerned.50  The
Court specified that, under this standard, it was permissible to provide
search engine users with a description of up to 155 characters, address and
rent details, and one single picture not exceeding the format of 194x145
pixels.51
In Germany, by contrast, the traditional confinement of the quotation
right to criticism and review was upheld when implementing the Copyright
Directive.  This more restrictive approach limits the room to manoeuvre
for the courts.  The District Court of Hamburg, for instance, refused to
bring thumbnails of pictures displayed by Google’s image search service
under the umbrella of the right of quotation.  Before turning to an analysis
of copyright exceptions, the Court clarified that a thumbnail did not have
characteristic features of its own that made the individual features of the
original work fade away.  Accordingly, there was no room for qualifying
the conversion of pictures into thumbnails as a “free use” not falling under
the exclusive rights of authors by virtue of § 24 of the German Copyright
Act.52
On this basis, the Court argued with regard to copyright exceptions
that thumbnails could not be regarded as permissible quotations in the
sense of § 51 no. 2 of the German Copyright Act because they did not
serve as evidence or argumentative basis for independent comment.53  The
stricter German quotation standard, still requiring use in the context of
criticism and comment, thus prevented the Court from offering breathing
space for the image-related search service in question. Interestingly, the
District Court of Hamburg expressly recognized that search engines were
of
essential importance for structuring the decentralized architecture of the
world wide web, localising widely scattered contents and knowledge, and
therefore, ultimately, for the functioning of a networked society.54
However, in spite of this “esteem for search engine services,” the
Court did not feel in a position to interpret the German quotation right
50 See Rechtbank Alkmaar, Aug. 7, 2007, case no. 96,206, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 148 (2007), with case comment by
Kamiel J. Koelman.  On procedural grounds, the judgement has been an-
nulled by Gerechtshof Amsterdam, Dec. 13, 2007, case no. LJN BC0125,
available at http://www.iept.nl.
51 See Rechtbank Alkmaar, case no. 96,206,  para. 4.14.
52 See Landgericht Hamburg , Sept. 26, 2008, case no. 308 O 248/07, sec. II.B.4,
available at  http://www.openjur.de/u/30461-308_o_248-07.html.
53 See id. sec. II.B.6.a.  With regard to the right of quotation in German copyright
law, see Gerhard Schricker, in URHEBERRECHT KOMMENTAR (Gerhard
Schricker ed., 3d ed. 2006).
54 See Landgericht Hamburg, case 308 O 248/07, sec. B.I.6.d.
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extensively to exempt the use of thumbnails for the image search system.
As the right of quotation had been designed with an eye to use under
different circumstances, the Court felt that it was the task of the legislator
to intervene and reconcile the interests of authors and right owners with
the strong public interest in access to graphical online information and the
economic interests of search engine providers.55  In the absence of an
open-ended fair use provision, the Court was paralyzed by an inflexible
limitation infrastructure.
In a recent decision that also dealt with Google’s image search ser-
vice, the German Federal Court of Justice confirmed that the unautho-
rized use of picture thumbnails did not fall under the right of quotation in
§ 51 of the German Copyright Act.  To fulfil the traditional context re-
quirement that had not been abandoned during the implementation of the
Copyright Directive, the user making the quotation would have to estab-
lish an inner connection between the quoted material and her own
thoughts.  This requirement was not satisfied in the case of picture
thumbnails that were merely used to inform the public about contents
available on the Internet.56  In this context, the Court stated that:
[N]either the technical developments concerning the dissemination of in-
formation on the Internet nor the interests of the parties which the excep-
tion seeks to protect justify an extensive interpretation of § 51 of the
German Copyright Act that goes beyond the purpose of making quota-
tions.  Neither the freedom of information of other Internet users, nor the
freedom of communication or the freedom of trade of search engine
providers, require such an extensive interpretation.57
This clarification indicates that the German Federal Court of Justice
did not deem it necessary to solve the case on the basis of the right of
quotation.  By contrast, the Court followed an alternative route to create
breathing space for the image search service at issue.  While it refrained
from inferring an implicit contractual license for search engine purposes
from the mere act of making content available on the Internet,58 the Court
held that Google’s use of the pictures was not unlawful because the copy-
right owner had consented implicitly to use of her material in the image
search service by making her works available online without employing
55 See id. sec. B.I.6.d.  With regard to the scope of the quotation right under the
German Copyright Act, see Thomas Dreier, Thumbnails als Zitate? – Zur
Reichweite von § 51 UrhG in der Informationsgesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFT
FU¨R ACHIM KRA¨MER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 225 (Uwe Blaurock, Joachim
Bornkamm & Christian Kirchberg eds., 2009).
56 See BGH, Apr. 29, 2010, case I ZR 69/08, at 11-12, available in German at
http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de.
57 See id. at 12-13.
58 See id. at 14-15.
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technical means to block the automatic indexing and displaying of online
content by search engines.59
It is unclear whether this solution on the basis of implicit consent will
yield satisfactory results in all cases of contested search engine use.  The
case before the District Court of Hamburg, for instance, concerned pro-
tected material that had not been made available by the copyright owner
but by an unauthorized third party.  In this constellation, implicit consent
can hardly be assumed. Referring to this situation, however, the German
Federal Court indicated that the search engine provider could rely on the
safe harbour for the hosting of third party content set forth in Article 14 of
EC Directive 2000/31.60  Accordingly, liability for copyright infringement
could be avoided by providing for appropriate notice-and-take-down
procedures.
The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice is of particular
interest because it shows a further consequence of the current restrictive
EC framework for copyright limitations.  As the hybrid concept of pre-
cisely-defined exceptions and the three-step test does not offer sufficient
room to manoeuvre for the courts, alternative routes are chosen to arrive
at satisfactory results.  The assumption of implicit consent, for instance,
appears as an attempt to bypass the inflexible copyright limitation infra-
structure.  It is questionable, however, whether this solution is consistent.
Virtually, the German Federal Court of Justice introduced a flexible ele-
ment through the back door of doubtful assumptions of the intentions of a
copyright owner making her works available on the Internet.
D. Need for Fair Use
In sum, case law from several EC Member States testifies to substan-
tial shortcomings in the current EC framework for copyright limitations.61
As demonstrated by the Dutch and French cases, legal certainty is mini-
mized under the current legal regime because the application of the open-
ended three-step test imposes unforeseeable constraints on exceptions that
are defined precisely in the national laws of EC Member States.  The deci-
sions in Germany show that the precise definition of exceptions renders
the limitation system incapable of fast reactions to new technological chal-
lenges.  Hence, it is to be concluded that the current EC framework for
copyright limitations offers neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility.
59 See id. at 15-19.
60 See id. at  21-22 (referring to ECJ, July 16, 2009, joined cases C-236/08–C-238/
08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., available at http://www.curia.eu). Cf. Direc-
tive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8,
2000, on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the internal market.
61 For a broader overview of EC case law, see Griffiths, supra note 28, at 4-10.
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Alternative routes to satisfactory results, such as the assumption of im-
plicit consent, may be chosen by the courts instead.  The fast development
of online technology and corresponding business models, however, re-
quires continuous recalibrations of copyright limitations within a reliable
framework.  User-generated content, search engine services and the digi-
tization of cultural material can serve as examples of current phenomena
requiring the reconsideration of the scope of limitations.62  Without suffi-
cient breathing space in the area of copyright limitations, important social,
cultural and economic benefits that could be derived from appropriate re-
actions to these challenges, are likely to be lost.
When it is considered that, in addition to insufficient legal certainty
and flexibility, lawmaking in the EC is much slower than in individual
countries, it becomes clear that the current regulation of limitations in the
EC is a worst case scenario.63  The process of updating EC copyright legis-
lation requires not only agreement at Community level but also national
implementation acts in all Member States.  Therefore, reactions to unfore-
seen technological developments and new social, cultural or economic
62 Cf. Natali Helberger et al., Legal Aspects of User Created Content (2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333; P. Bernt Hugenholtz, De
Google Book-schikking: de wereldliteratuur gelicentieerd, NJB 2145 (2009);
Paul Katzenberger, Zwangsdigitalisierung urheberrechtlich geschu¨zter
Werke in den USA und in Deutschland: das Projekt Google Book Search
und § 137l UrhG, GRUR INT’L 563 (2010); M. Knopp, Fanfiction—
nutzergenerierte Inhalte und das Urheberrecht, GRUR 28 (2010); Anne-
marie C. Beunen, De Google Book Search Settlement nader beschouwd en
bekeken vanuit bibliotheken, TISCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN IN-
FORMATIERECHT 38 (2010); Stefan Bechtold, Optionsmodelle und private
Rechtzetzung im Urheberrecht am Beispiel von Google Book Search, GRUR
282 (2010); Martin R.F. Senftleben, Pacman forever—preservering van com-
putergames, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN INFORMATIERECHT
221 (2009). MIRJAM ELFERINK & ALLARD  RINGNALDA, DIGITALE ONT-
SLUITING VAN HISTORISCHE ARCHIEVEN EN VERWEESDE WERKEN (2009);
Joris V.J. Van Hoboken, De aansprakelijkheid van zoekmachines.
Uitzondering zonder regels of regels zonder uitzondering?, COMPUTER-
RECHT 15 (2008); Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing
Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 IIC 669
(2007); David B. Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the Orphan
Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate Or-
phan Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 13 (2007).
63 See Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in The Netherlands – A Renaissance?,
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 1, 2-4 (2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986.  To reduce the harm flowing
from the Copyright Directive, the EC three-step test should at least be con-
strued flexibly.  For guidelines in this regard, see Christophe Geiger,
Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Declaration on a Balanced Interpreta-
tion of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 IIC 707 (2008).
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needs will not only be slow like in traditional continental-European sys-
tems with precisely-defined exceptions.  In the EC, these reactions will be
very slow, and far too slow to keep pace with the rapid development of the
Internet, because additional law and policy making at EC level is required.
While the reported German cases give evidence of attempts to find
loopholes for the creation of more breathing space by circumventing the
current restrictive combination of exceptions and the three-step test, it is
obvious that these remedies are rather inconsistent and incompatible with
the overall structure of copyright law.  The right place to strike a proper
balance between freedom and protection in copyright law is the regulation
of copyright limitations.  Instead of inducing courts to invent around an
overly restrictive framework for limitations, EC copyright law should pro-
vide the courts with the legal instruments necessary to maintain copy-
right’s delicate balance even in times of rapid technological developments
that require constant and fast adaptations to new circumstances.
In other words, the introduction of a fair use provision in the field of
copyright limitations is indispensable to overcome the current lamentable
state of the EC system and realize the central advantage of open-ended
norms that is essential in the current situation.  Enhanced flexibility in the
area of EC copyright limitations is not only needed because of the rapid
development of the Internet.  It is also required because the process of EC
policy making in the field of copyright limitations is far too slow to main-
tain a closed system of precisely-defined exceptions that necessitates re-
peated legislative intervention.  Given the social, cultural and economic
concerns at stake, it would be irresponsible not to switch to more sustaina-
ble law making that includes flexible fair use elements.64
64 U.S. courts relied on fair use, for instance, to deal with advanced search engine
services and user-generated content.  As for image search services, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the smaller, indexed images of
Google’s image search qualified as a fair use under the U.S. fair use doc-
trine.  The court grounded its analysis on the notion of transformative use
that, traditionally, constitutes an important factor capable of tipping the
scales to a finding of fair use. Cf. Leval, supra note 6, at 1111; Neil W.
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 381
(1996).  Pointing out a significant benefit to the public, the court noted that
“a search engine may be more transformative than a parody because a
search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a
parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.”
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007).  In this
vein, the court concluded that “the significantly transformative nature of
Google’s search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs
Google’s superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this case.
In reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of analyzing fair use
flexibly in light of new circumstances.” Id. at 723.  With regard to user-
generated content, see Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d
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IV. EC FAIR USE DOCTRINE
So far, the term “fair use” has been used primarily as a reference to
the fair use doctrine in US copyright law. While the incorporation of the
U.S. doctrine into the EC copyright system may appear desirable to har-
monize copyright law on both sides of the Atlantic,65 it is clear that this
radical departure from the current legal framework in the EC and the con-
tinental-European civil law tradition is highly unlikely, if not unfeasible.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a sudden change from a closed cata-
logue of exceptions to an open-ended norm that occupies centre stage
within the limitation infrastructure would yield the expected beneficial re-
sults.  In an environment where the doctrine, unlike in the U.S., has not
evolved gradually, and where the courts have little experience with the
recalibration of copyright’s balance in the light of open-ended criteria, it
might be overly ambitious to erode long-standing EC exceptions, such as
press privileges, the quotation right and exemptions for parody, and re-
place them with a general fair use doctrine.
Hence, the present inquiry does not necessarily seek to clarify
whether the interplay of a broad fair use provision with several highly spe-
cific exceptions, as in the U.S. copyright system, could serve as a model for
the more flexible regulation of limitations in the EC.  By contrast, it is the
central purpose of the present inquiry to clarify whether some flexible fair
use element could be added to the restrictive EC framework without
changing the structure of the system radically.  In the present context, the
term “fair use”, thus, broadly refers to an opening clause that would add
flexibility to the regulation of copyright limitations.  It does not refer di-
rectly to a literal copy of the U.S. doctrine.  In particular, a fair use de-
fence may feature less prominently in the system of EC copyright
limitations than it does in the U.S.  Any future regulation of EC limita-
tions is likely to remain predominantly based on precisely-defined excep-
tions, even if a flexible fair use element is included.  Rather than
abolishing long-standing EC exceptions in the course of introducing a
broad fair use clause, the EC discussion on fair use will most probably lead
to the maintenance of a comprehensive list of specific exceptions that is
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  Cf. Andrew J. Sanders, J.K. Rowling and the Lexicon,
Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc. v. J.K. Rowling v. RDR Books, et al,
EIPR 45 (2009).
65 This step has been proposed by Griffiths, supra note 28, at 21.  With regard to
the recent introduction of fair use in Israel, see O. Fischman Afori, An
Open Standard “Fair Use” Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli Initiative, EIPR 85
(2008); Guy Pessach, The New Israeli Copyright Act – A Case-Study in Re-
verse Comparative Law, 41 IIC 187-93 (2010); Amira Dotan et al., Fair Use
Best Practices for Higher Education Insitutions: The Israeli Experience (this
issue).
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supplemented rather than replaced with an open-ended fair use clause.66
Allowing the identification of additional types of permissible unauthorized
use in the light of the individual circumstances of a given case, this clause
would nonetheless open up the currently closed catalogue of limitations
that are permissible in the EC.
Moreover, it is to be considered that fair use need not be equated
with use free of charge in an EC context.  While the U.S. fair use doctrine
does not provide for the payment of equitable remuneration, the inclusion
of this feature can hardly be deemed incompatible with the notion of an
EC fair use doctrine.  The payment of fair compensation constitutes an
important feature of the current limitation system in the Copyright Direc-
tive and the copyright acts of many EC Member States.67  It is understood
to enhance the breathing space for unauthorized use.  When the permis-
sion of a specific form of unauthorized use seems desirable even though it
impacts deeply on the position of the right owner, the payment of ade-
quate compensation constitutes an additional balancing tool that can be
used to minimize the corrosive effect of the exemption. The harm flowing
from a broad user privilege, such as the exemption of digital private copy-
ing, can be reduced to acceptable, reasonable proportions.68  As this
mechanism enhances the room to manoeuvre in the area of copyright limi-
tations, it is advisable to include compensation payments in a future EC
fair use system.
Considering these determinants of an EC fair use doctrine, the three-
step test that is already enshrined in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Direc-
tive appears as a logical starting point for future fair use initiatives.69  Like
66 Cf. the detailed discussion of different types of fair use legislation by FO¨RSTER,
supra note 13, at 211-22.
67 See EC Copyright Directive rec. 35 (“In certain cases of exceptions or limita-
tions, rightholders should receive fair compensation to compensate them
adequately for the use made of their protected works or other subject-mat-
ter.  When determining the form, detailed arrangements and possible level
of such fair compensation, account should be taken of the particular circum-
stances of each case.  When evaluating these circumstances, a valuable crite-
rion would be the possible harm to the rightholders resulting from the act in
question.”).
68 This solution is adopted in the EC Copyright Directive. See EC Copyright
Directive 5(2)(a)–(b).
69 As to the application of the three-step test criteria in the framework of a fair
use weighing process, see Kamiel J. Koelman, Fixing the Three-Step Test,
EIPR 407 (2006); Martin R.F. Senftleben, Beperkingen a` la carte: Waarom
de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
AUTEURS-, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 19 (2003).  However, see also the
conclusions drawn by Griffiths, supra note 28, who doubts that the three-
step test offers an appropriate basis for the enhancement of flexibility in the
area of copyright limitations.
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traditional fair use legislation, the three-step test sets forth open-ended
factors.  The drafting history of the three-step test confirms that the flexi-
ble formula has its roots in the Anglo-American copyright tradition.70
Not surprisingly, a line between the criteria of the three-step test and the
factors to be found in fair use provisions, such as the U.S. fair use doctrine,
can easily be drawn.  The prohibition of a conflict with a normal exploita-
tion, for instance, recalls the fourth factor of the U.S. fair use doctrine
“effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.”71  Given the appearance of the three-step test in several
EC Directives,72 the provision can moreover be regarded as part of the
established legal principles of EC law.  In line with the corresponding in-
ternational provisions, the EC three-step test is moreover understood to
offer enhanced breathing space for limitations when copyright owners are
adequately compensated for exempted unauthorized use.73
The introduction of an EC fair use doctrine on the basis of the three-
step test, however, requires a substantial change in the current EC ap-
proach. The three-step test would have to be redefined. Instead of perceiv-
ing and employing the test exclusively as a straitjacket of copyright
limitations — a means of placing further constraints on precisely-defined
exceptions — it would be necessary to recognize that the open-ended cri-
teria of the test allow not only the restriction but also the introduction and
broadening of limitations. Interestingly, this more holistic interpretation
corresponds to the concept underlying the international three-step test
(section IV.A).  As the EC provision is derived from the relevant interna-
tional norms, this first hurdle on the way towards an EC fair use doctrine
is thus surmountable.  An additional question, however, is whether na-
tional fair use legislation is compatible with the international three-step
test (section IV.B).  If the international three-step test precludes the intro-
duction of fair use at the national level, the test can hardly serve as a basis
for an EC fair use doctrine.  This fundamental question will be discussed
70 See observation by the United Kingdom, Doc. S/13, RECORDS OF THE INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM JUNE 11 TO JULY 14,
1967,  at 630 (1971) [hereinafter RECORDS 1967]. Cf. SENFTLEBEN, supra
note 3, 47-52.
71 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  With regard to the application of fair use analyses
concerning the fourth factor in the context of the three-step test, see SENF-
TLEBEN, supra note 3, at 184-87.
72 See the overview provided by SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 245.
73 With regard to the three-step tests in Article 9(2) Berne Convention, 13 TRIPs
and 10 WCT, it is recognized that the payment of equitable remuneration
may be used to reduce an unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests to a
permissible, reasonable level.  This principle is also applied in the context of
the EC Copyright Directive. See EC Copyright Directive rec. 35. Cf. SENF-
TLEBEN, supra note 3, at 125-33.
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before tracing the conceptual contours of a future EC fair use doctrine
(section IV.C).
A. Enabling Function of the Three-Step Test
In international copyright law, there can be little doubt that the three-
step test does not only serve the purpose of restricting national copyright
limitations.  At the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the
Berne Convention, the first three-step test in international copyright law
was devised as a flexible framework, within which national legislators
would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national limitations and satisfy-
ing domestic social, cultural and economic needs.74  The provision was in-
tended to serve as a basis of national copyright limitations.  Accordingly,
Article 9(2) Berne Convention offers national law makers the freedom:
to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, pro-
vided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the author.
This three-step test made its way into Article 13 TRIPS and played a
decisive role during the negotiations of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties.75
In Article 10(1) WCT, it paved the way for agreement on limitations of the
rights newly granted under the WIPO Copyright Treaty, including the
right of online making available as part of the general right of communica-
tion to the public.76  In the context of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, it has
moreover been clarified that the international test, indeed, constitutes a
means of enabling limitations and enhancing the flexibility of the copy-
right system:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Par-
ties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environ-
ment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been
considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these pro-
74 See Doc. S/1, RECORDS 1967, supra note 70, 81.
75 With regard to the evolution of this “family” of copyright three-step tests in
international copyright law, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, 43-98; N. Dit-
trich, Der Dreistufentest, in BEITRA¨GE ZUM URHEBERRECHT VIII, at 63 (N.
Dittrich ed., 2005); Joachim Bornkamm, Der Dreistufentest als urheberrech-
tliche Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere eines Begriffs, in HANS-JUˆRGEN
AHRENS ET AL., FESTSCHRIFT FU¨R WILLI ERDMANN ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG
29 (2002).
76 As a consequence, the three-step test of Article 10(1) WCT is the central
threshold for limitations on the right of making available online.  As to the
debate in the context of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties, see SENFTLEBEN,
supra note 3, at 96-98; MIHA´LY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE
INTERNET – THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IM-
PLEMENTATION (2002); JO¨RG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE
WIPO TREATIES 1996 – COMMENTARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002).
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visions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new
exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network
environment.77
At the national level, the three-step test has been used in this ena-
bling sense,78 for instance, in decisions of the German Federal Court of
Justice.  In a 1999 case concerning the Technical Information Library Han-
nover, the Court underlined the public interest in unhindered access to
information.  Accordingly, it offered support for the Library’s practice of
copying and dispatching scientific articles on request by single persons and
industrial undertakings.79  The legal basis of this practice was the statutory
limitation for personal use in § 53 of the German Copyright Act.  Under
this provision, the authorized user need not necessarily produce the copy
herself but is free to ask a third party to make the reproduction on her
behalf.  The Court admitted that the dispatch of copies came close to a
publisher’s activity.80  Nonetheless, it refrained from putting an end to the
library practice by assuming a conflict with a work’s normal exploitation.
Instead, the Court deduced an obligation to pay equitable remuneration
from the three-step test, and enabled the continuation of the information
service in this way.81
In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing of press arti-
cles for internal e-mail communication in a private company, the Court
gave a further example of its flexible approach to the three-step test.  It
held that digital press reviews had to be deemed permissible under § 49(1)
77 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10.
78 Cf. Annette Kur, of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for
Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, Max Planck Insti-
tute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Se-
ries No. 08-04 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317707; Geiger,
The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, supra note 28,
at 694-96; Martin R.F. Senftleben, Grundprobleme des urheberrechtlichen
Dreistufentests, GRUR INT’L 200, 206-07) (2004).  For an overview of na-
tional case law applying the three-step test as a flexible standard, see Grif-
fiths, supra note 28.  For a proposal to use the three-step test as an
instrument to delineate the exclusive rights of copyright owners, see Daniel
Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse
Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005).
79 See Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] Feb. 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, JURIS-
TENZEITUNG [JZ] 1000 (1999), with case comment by H. Schack.  For an
English description of the case, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, 206-208.
80 See BGH, JZ at 1004.
81 See id. at 1005-07. Cf. Patrick Baronikians, Kopienversand durch Bibliotheken
– rechtliche Beurteilung und Vorschla¨ge zur Regelung, ZUM 126 (1999).  In
the course of subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act, the German
legislature modelled a new copyright limitation on the court’s decision.
§ 53a of the German Copyright Act goes beyond the court decision by in-
cluding the dispatch of digital copies in graphical format.
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of the German Copyright Act just like their analogue counterparts, if the
digital version — in terms of its functioning and potential for use — essen-
tially corresponded to traditional analogue products.82  To overcome the
problem of an outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed to indicate the
limitation’s confinement to press reviews on paper,83 the Court stated
that, in view of new technical developments, a copyright limitation may be
interpreted extensively.84  Taking these considerations as a starting point,
the Court arrived at the conclusion that digital press reviews were permis-
sible, if articles were included in graphical format without offering addi-
tional functions, such as a text collection and an index.  This extension of
the analogue press review exception to the digital environment, the Court
maintained, was in line with the three-step test.85
Hence, the test can be used to enable limitations and enhance flexibil-
ity in copyright law.  National legislation adopting a fair use approach,
however, goes beyond the described court decisions.  It allows the courts
to create new limitations on the basis of abstract factors instead of entrust-
ing them merely with the flexible interpretation of pre-defined, specific
exceptions.  In other words, national fair use legislation “institutionalizes”
the function of enabling limitations which the international three-step test
has because of its open-ended wording.
B. Three-Step Test and Fair Use
Against this background, it is not surprising that doubt has been cast
upon the compliance of national fair use legislation with the international
three-step test.  In particular, it has been asserted that a national fair use
system did not qualify as a “certain special case” in the sense of the three-
step test.86  This argument is based on the three-step tests of Article 13
82 See BGH, July 11, 2002, case I ZR 255/00, GRUR 963 (2002); JZ 473 (2003),
with case comment by Thomas Dreier. Cf. Thomas Hoeren, Pressespiegel
und das Urheberrecht, GRUR 1022 (2002).
83 The German Copyright Act, § 49(1) as in force at that time, referred to
Informationsbla¨tter.
84 See BGH, JZ at 966.
85 See id. at 966-67.  The court referred to the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the
EC Copyright Directive.  The EC three-step test enshrined in this provision,
however, does not deviate from the international three-step test.
86 As to the debate on the impact of the three-step test on open-ended limita-
tions, such as the U.S. fair use doctrine, cf. FO¨RSTER, supra note 13, at 191-
201; SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 133-37 and 162-68; Bornkamm, supra
note 75, 45-46; Herman Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and
Their Abuse, EIPR 359 (2005); SAM RICKETSON, THE THREE-STEP TEST,
DEEMED QUANTITIES, LIBRARIES AND CLOSED EXCEPTIONS 147-54 (2003);
Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information
Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2001); Ruth Okediji, Toward an Interna-
tional Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 75, 116-30 (2000);
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TRIPs and Article 10(2) WCT.  In contrast to the aforementioned Article
9(2) BC and Article 10(1) WCT, these tests do not primarily serve as a
basis for national limitations. Article 13 TRIPs and Article 10(2) WCT
rather constitute additional safeguards seeking to ensure that all kinds of
copyright limitations keep within the limits of the three-step test.87  Inter-
preting the TRIPS test, however, the WTO Panel reporting on Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act did not endorse the view that fair use, by
definition, was incompatible with the requirement of “certain special
cases.”  Instead, the Panel followed a more cautious approach:
However, there is no need to identify explicitly each and every possible
situation to which the exception could apply, provided that the scope of
the exception is known and particularised. This guarantees a sufficient
degree of legal certainty.88
In this way, the Panel left room for national copyright laws providing
for fair use. Legal certainty is not necessarily an exclusive task of the legis-
lator.  It may be divided between law makers and judges. In fair use sys-
tems, the degree of legal certainty need not be lower than in systems with
precisely-defined statutory limitations.  The open factors constituting the
fair use criteria allow the courts to determine “certain special cases” of
permissible unauthorized use in the light of the individual circumstances of
a given case.  With every court decision, a further “special case” becomes
known, particularized and thus “certain” in the sense of the three-step
test.  A sufficient degree of legal certainty follows from established case
Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States:
Will Fair Use Survive?, EIPR 236 (1999); Tyler Newby, What’s Fair Here is
Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate Interna-
tional Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (1999).
87 For a discussion of the different functions of the three-step test, and the differ-
ence between Articles 9(2) Berne Convention and 10(1) WCT on the one
hand, and Articles 13 TRIPs and 10(2) WCT on the other, see SENFTLEBEN,
supra note 3, at 118-25.
88 See WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R, para. 6.108, available at http://www.wto.org,.
For comments on the report, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Towards a Hori-
zontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? – WTO Panel Re-
ports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests
in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 IIC  407 (2006); Miha´ly Ficsor, How Much
of What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Cases, 192 RIDA 111 (2002); Jo Oliver, Copyright in the
WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
119 (2002); David J. Brennan, The Three-Step Test Frenzy – Why the TRIPS
Panel Decision Might Be Considered Per Incuriam, INTELL. PROP. Q. 213
(2002); Jane Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO
Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, RIDA
13 (2001); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, De wettelijke beperkingen beperkt. De WTO
geeft de driestappentoets tanden, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN
INFORMATIERECHT 197 (2000).
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law instead of detailed legislation.  For instance, a sufficient degree of legal
certainty can be attained in a system with a long-standing fair use tradi-
tion, such as the U.S. copyright system.89
Moreover, it is to be recalled that flexible law making in the field of
copyright limitations is a particular feature of the Anglo-American copy-
right tradition.  At the international level, a WTO Panel can be expected
to take into account both the continental-European and the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition of copyright law.  The Panel’s formula of “a sufficient degree
of legal certainty” can thus be understood to ensure that not only pre-
cisely-defined civil law exceptions but also common law fair use limitations
are capable of passing the test of “certain special cases.”  Otherwise, an
entire tradition of legal thinking would be discredited and declared incom-
patible with international standards.  The international three-step test,
therefore, can hardly be understood to preclude national fair use legisla-
tion.  With the open-ended factors of special cases, normal exploitation,
legitimate interests and unreasonable prejudice, the test itself is a source
of inspiration for flexible law making in the field of copyright limitations
rather than an obstacle to the introduction of national fair use systems.
C. Conceptual Contours
In this vein, an EC fair use doctrine can be established on the basis of
the three-step test embodied in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive.
As the international three-step test does not militate against national fair
use legislation, policy makers in the EC are free to model an EC fair use
doctrine on the test’s flexible, open-ended criteria. Such a provision based
on the three-step test, and incorporated into the Copyright Directive as a
new Article 5(5), could take the following shape:
In certain special cases comparable to those reflected in the exceptions
and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, the use of works
or other subject-matter may also be exempted from the reproduction
right provided for in Article 2 and/or the right of communication and
making available to the public provided for in Article 3, provided that
such use does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other
subject-matter and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the rightholder.90
89 In this sense, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 162-68. Cf. Beebe, supra note
6.  However, see the critical comments by FO¨RSTER, supra note 13, at 197-
201, on the unrestricted openness of the U.S. system.  With regard to the
predictability of fair use decisions, see also Nimmer, supra note 6.
90 This proposal is in line with Article 5.5 of the European Copyright Code that is
the result of the Wittern Project that was established in 2002 as a collabora-
tion between copyright scholars across the European Union concerned with
the future development of European copyright law.  The proposed Euro-
pean Copyright Code of the Wittern Project is available online at
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This wording would indicate that the exceptions enumerated in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 5 of the Copyright Directive are re-
garded as certain special cases in the sense of the three-step test. Accord-
ingly, they can serve as a reference point for the identification of further
cases of permissible unauthorized use on the basis of the proposed EC fair
use doctrine.  In line with this approach, these further cases would have to
be comparable with those reflected in the enumerated exceptions, for in-
stance, in the sense that they serve comparable purposes or are justified by
comparable policies. The catalogue of explicitly listed EC exceptions
would thus fulfil the same function as the indication of purposes, “such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research,”
in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
As indicated above, the first condition to be considered by the judge
— no conflict with a normal exploitation — can be understood to forge a
link with the U.S. fair use factor “effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work.”  An interpretation of this condi-
tion in line with established U.S. case law would contribute to the
harmonization of EC and U.S. copyright limitations.91  The second condi-
tion — no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests — can be under-
stood as a refined proportionality test.  The detriment to the copyright
www.copyrightcode.eu.  With regard to national court decisions that can be
regarded as precursors of the proposed development of new exceptions on
the basis of the existing catalogue or precisely defined exceptions, see Hoge
Raad, Oct. 20, 1995, Dior/Evora, no. 682, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
(1996), with case comment by Jaap H. Spoor; TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-,
MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 51 (1996), with case comment by F. Willem
Grosheide.  In this decision, the Hoge Raad, id., para. 3.6.2, held that the
specific exceptions laid down in the Dutch Copyright Act did not necessa-
rily exclude the further delineation of the limits of copyright protection “in
other cases on the basis of a comparable weighing of interests.” Cf. JAAP H.
SPOOR, D.W. FEER VERKADE & DIRK J.G. VISSER, AUTEURSRECHT 221
(3d ed. 2005).
91 With regard to the application of fair use analyses concerning the fourth factor
in the context of the three-step test, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 184-
87.  Lessons for the application of an EC fair use doctrine can particularly
be derived from experiences with an overly broad application of the fourth
factor test.  As pointed out by Leval, supra note 6, 1124-25 (“By definition
every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary
user has not paid royalties.  Therefore, if an insubstantial loss of revenue
turned the fourth factor in favor of the copyright holder, this factor would
never weigh in favor of the secondary use. . . .  The market impairment
should not turn the fourth factor unless it is reasonably substantial. When
the injury to the copyright holder’s potential market would substantially
impair the incentive to create works for publication, the objectives of the
copyright law require that this factor weigh heavily against the secondary
user.”).
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owner should be reasonably related to the social, cultural or economic
benefits that can be derived from the exemption of the use in question.  In
this context, the payment of equitable remuneration is to be factored into
the equation.  An unreasonable prejudice may be reduced to a permissi-
ble, reasonable level by providing for adequate monetary compensation.92
V. CONCLUSION AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The EC system of copyright limitations is in a lamentable state.  The
traditional continental-European approach to copyright limitations pro-
motes legal certainty by providing for precisely-defined exceptions.  In the
Anglo-American copyright tradition, open-ended fair use legislation en-
hances flexibility.  The current EC regulation of copyright limitations,
however, fails to realize any of these potential advantages.  The three-step
test enshrined in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive offers flexible,
open-ended factors.  However, this flexibility is not used to create addi-
tional breathing space for copyright limitations.  By contrast, the three-
step test is applied to further restrict exceptions that are already defined
precisely in the national laws of EC Member States.  As a result of the
additional application of open-ended factors, the legal certainty that could
follow from the precise definition of exceptions is minimized. In conse-
quence, the current EC system offers neither legal certainty nor sufficient
flexibility.  When it is considered that, in addition, law and policy making
in the EC is much slower than in individual countries, it becomes obvious
that the current legal framework is a worst case scenario.  With use privi-
leges being forced into an inflexible legislative straitjacket, the EC limita-
tion infrastructure can hardly keep pace with the rapid development of
Internet technology. Important opportunities for social, cultural and eco-
nomic development offered by new Internet platforms and services are
likely to be missed.
As a way out, it is indispensable to incorporate flexible fair use ele-
ments into the system. This solution need not lead to a radical change in
92 For a detailed discussion of the third criterion of the three-step test as a refined
proportionality test, see SENFTLEBEN, supra note 3, at 226-44.  As for the
payment of equitable remuneration, see the example accompanying the in-
troduction of the three-step test at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, Report
on the Work of Main Committee I, RECORDS 1967, supra note 70, 1145-46
(“A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes.  If it
consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be permit-
ted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work.  If it implies a
rather large number of copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that,
according to national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid.  If a
small number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without
payment, particularly for individual or scientific use.”).
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the structure of the EC system.  In particular, it is not necessary to sacri-
fice long-standing EC exceptions on the altar of a broad fair use provision.
By contrast, it would be sufficient to take full advantage of the flexibility
inherent in the three-step test that has already become a cornerstone of
EC legislation in the field of copyright limitations.  Like in international
copyright law, the three-step test would have to be perceived and used as a
flexible balancing tool fulfilling different functions.  In case of overly
broad use privileges, the test may serve as a means to reduce the scope of
the limitation to reasonable proportions.  In case of a need for more room
to manoeuvre, however, the three-step test should be employed as a vehi-
cle to broaden existing limitations and introduce new use privileges.  In
this way, an appropriate copyright framework could be established, for
instance, with regard to advanced search engine services, the digitization
of cultural material and user-generated content.
A future EC fair use doctrine should use the current catalogue of EC
exceptions in Article 5 of the Copyright Directive as examples of “certain
special cases” in the sense of the three-step test, and entrust the courts
with the task of identifying comparable further cases on the basis of the
abstract criteria of “no conflict with a normal exploitation” and “no unrea-
sonable prejudice to legitimate interests.”  While the normal exploitation
criterion can be understood to be in line with the U.S. fair use factor of
“effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work,” the unreasonable prejudice criterion constitutes a refined
proportionality test that takes account of the payment of equitable remu-
neration.  Fair use in the EC, thus, would not necessarily mean use free of
charge.
This EC fair use doctrine would not only remedy the shortcomings of
the current EC system.  It can also be expected to have a beneficial effect
on the further harmonization of copyright limitations at the international
level.93  As indicated, the proposed fair use provision would forge a link
with the U.S. fair use doctrine that could lead to comparable reactions to
the current challenges of Internet technology.  More importantly, how-
ever, an EC fair use doctrine based on the three-step test would reflect a
balanced, holistic approach to the test.  The open-ended criteria set forth
93 With regard to current WIPO initiatives in the area of copyright limitations,
see the overview provided in document SCCR/20/4.  With regard to recent
studies concerning educational activities, see documents SCCR/19/4
(Monroy Study); SCCR/19/5 (Fometeu Study): SCCR/19/6 (Nabhan Study);
SCCR/19/7 (Seng Study); SCCR/19/8 (Xalabarder Study).  As for the cur-
rent debate on exceptions and limitations for educational activities and
practice, and measures for the benefit of persons with print disabilities, see
document SCCR/20/3; SCCR/20/5.  The WIPO documents are available at
http://www.wipo.int. Cf. THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLEC-
TUAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Neil W. Netanel ed., 2007).
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in the three-step test have always been intended to provide a flexible
framework, within which national legislators enjoy the freedom of safe-
guarding national limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural and
economic needs.94  Not only the restriction of excessive copyright limita-
tions but also the broadening of important use privileges, and the intro-
duction of new exemptions fall within the test’s ambit of operation.  What
is proposed here, in other words, is a renaissance of the initial understand-
ing of the three-step test — a renaissance of the test as a refined propor-
tionality test that offers breathing space for unauthorized use within
reasonable limits.  The reinforcement of this balanced understanding of
the test is central to the international debate on copyright limitations.  It
challenges the rhetoric of a three-step test that is primarily designed to
restrict all kinds of copyright limitations.95
94 See Doc. S/1, RECORDS 1967, supra note 70, at 81.
95 Cf. Geiger, Griffiths & Hilty, supra note 63.
